This paper starts with a general contextualisation of how Canadian constitutional law acquired an important role in global constitutional conversations in recent decades. It then considers, in particular, the well-known Canadian Living tree doctrine as a model of evolutionary constitutional interpretation, and argues that it is a relevant case study for our purposes since it is able to precisely link the 'history, evolution, influence and reform' of constitutional law in a comprehensive doctrine. The doctrine's comparative influence will be analysed in particular: the Living tree is especially relevant, since its comparative influence is traceable both in the work of courts that are historical participants in transnational judicial conversations, and courts that are new players in the game.
Introduction
The symposium, and this special issue, are appropriately devoted to the history and evolution of Canadian constitutional law, and aim at exploring its comparative influence as a complementary dimension. These sought to examine the 'history, evolution, influence and reform' of the Canadian constitutional experience. I am sympathetic with this organic approach: after all, in an age of the renaissance of comparative constitutional law (Hirschl 2014) , one could even argue that the comparative influence of a national constitutional law is actually part of its history and evolution, and can even have consequences at the internal level.
In this light, my reflections will start from a general contextualisation on how Canadian constitutional law acquired, over recent decades, an important role in global constitutional conversations. I will then consider in particular the well-known Canadian Living tree doctrine as a model of evolutionary constitutional interpretation (Waluchow 2007) , and will argue that it is a relevant case study for our purposes since it is able to precisely link the 'history, evolution, influence and reform' of constitutional law in a comprehensive doctrine. I will then look in particular at the comparative influence of such a doctrine, especially relevant, I
argue, since such an influence is traceable both in the work of courts that are historical participants of transnational judicial conversations (Slaughter 1994; McCrudden 2000) and courts that are new players in the game. by an authoritative interpreter of it: and in a certain sense, it is precisely an example of how, today, the comparative influence of a national constitutional law is actually part of its history and evolution, also discussed at the internal level.
But the anecdote is an example of something that has been studied by scholars in a more comprehensive way; recent and very popular quantitative studies were devoted precisely to the effort of proving the 'declining influence of the United States constitution' (Law and Versteeg 2012) . For the sake of our reflections, it is not relevant to discuss whether they succeeded or not: what is actually relevant, I think, is that in these articles the authors highlighted the influence, as comparative models, of other competitive 'transnational constitutional paradigms', and explicitly designated Canada as the first new 'constitutional superpower' (Law and Versteeg 2012: 809 et seq.) . In this sense, again, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was adopted in conjunction with the patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982, has been described as the leading influence on the drafting of the South African Bill of Rights, the Israeli Basic Laws, the New Zealand Bill of Rights, and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, amongst others (Law and Versteeg 2012: 810; Choudhry 1999: 820-821 elsewhere. In the Foreword, the focus was explicitly on judicial interpretative activity: Barak somehow replicated the critical remarks discussed above, on declining and rising comparative constitutional influences, but he did so by specifically discussing the importance of judicial interpretation provided by national apical courts, and its relevance in transnational judicial conversations. He was so explicit in this respect that he distinguished the two levels of discussion, and acknowledged that 'we foreign jurists all look to developments in the United States as a source of inspiration', but 'out of deep appreciation for the impressive accomplishments of United States constitutional law and of its Supreme Court in particular' in historical terms, critical remarks could be based on the fact that 'the American Supreme Court (…) is losing the central role it once had among courts in modern democracies ' (Barak 2002: 27) . In this context, the Canadian Supreme Court was E -90 extricate themselves from the heavy hands of intentionalism and originalism in interpreting the constitution and adopt a 'purposive interpretation of the constitution' (Barak 2002: 72-73) . In this context, the words of several judges of the Canadian Supreme Court were cited in extenso (Barak 2002: 39, 42, 44, 51, 68, 114) .
In the same vein, Anne Marie Slaughter, one of the first and more renowned scholars to describe and discuss transjudicial communications through which judges are 'building a global community of law', singled out the South African Constitutional Court and the 'Canadian Constitutional Court' (sic) as 'disproportionately influential' and 'highly influential, apparently more so than the U.S. Supreme Court and other older and more Constitution's use of the term 'persons', which had always referred to men, the JCPC decided that both men and women were now 'persons', and therefore could be equally called to sit in the Canadian senate. According to the historically celebrated words of Justice Sankey, while constitutional stability and integrity are of crucial importance, the Constitution 'also planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits'. Women may not have been able to vote or hold office in 1867, but times had changed and so had to change constitutional interpretation: the decision led women to gain a measure of equality to men in the political arena. As has been already said (Jackson 2006), the Living tree doctrine could be considered as just one of the many metaphors used in different legal settings to describe the classic claim that, in a judicial pragmatic perspective, a constitution has a dynamic meaning, or that it has the properties of animate being or other object capable of change. XI The idea, as wellknown, is associated with views that contemporaneous society should be taken into account when interpreting key constitutional phrases.
E -95
In this respect, the best known example of a similar metaphor can be found in the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society'. As also well-known, such an interpretative framework is opposed to other To support my argument, I will look at a sample of relevant cases from different jurisdictions.
The Living Tree doctrine as a distinctive model of evolutionary constitutional interpretation
We will look at three cases from different jurisdictions where comparative arguments based on reliance of the Canadian Supreme Court's precedents were put forward. E -99 in particular, those dissenting arguments were relevant for the South African Court's decision in Makwanyane, which relied on the Canadian Supreme Court's idea that 'a right or freedom guaranteed' is 'to be ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee' and 'in other words, in the light of the interests it was meant to protect', 'and the purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concept enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated', to state that '(T)he death penalty not only deprives the prisoner of all vestiges of human dignity, it is the ultimate desecration of the individual as a human being. It is the annihilation of the very essence of human dignity'. E -100 internal necessities of the work itself'. Thus, the Israeli Court relied here on a case in which the Canadian Supreme Court was evaluating the constitutionality of provisions of the Criminal Code dealing with obscenity, and specifically the phrase 'undue exploitation', by acknowledging that the concept meant different things at different times, appealing far more to conceptions of morality than to law, and is therefore inherently subjective. The Canadian Court implicitly argued that Parliament intended for the term to reflect evolving standards, since the term 'undue' invariably requires a fact specific inquiry that, like the term 'reasonable', cannot be divorced from modern standards and conceptions. In the face of an ambiguous meaning, the Court rightly adopted the less intrusive option: this was based on the argument according to which the overriding objective of the Charter (s. 163)
was not moral disapprobation but the avoidance of harm to society, and therefore the constitutional interpretation was based on a specific quest for the constitutional goal or purpose to be compared with the legislative decision of the Parliament: a move that the Israeli Supreme Court effectively replicated in Station Film Co. Ltd. v. The Film Review Board, arguing that the respondent's order to delete the pornographic parts of the film was invalid, except for the portions which the petitioner had agreed to delete. 
Some tentative conclusions
What I have tried to demonstrate in the paper is, in short, the multi-faceted influence of Canadian constitutionalism, for reasons ranging from the general to the particular.
It is widely discussed and influential in comparative terms in a sort of material/structural sense: it has experienced a relatively recent exercise of codification, a fruitful one, and this was then adopted elsewhere as a model, and much discussed by scholars, even attracting controversy. XX Par. 9: 'Para avanzar en el razonamiento es preciso dar un paso más en la interpretación del precepto. Se hace necesario partir de un presupuesto inicial, basado en la idea, expuesta como hemos visto por el Abogado del Estado en sus alegaciones, de que la Constitución es un 'árbol vivo', -en expresión de la sentencia Privy Council, Edwards c. Attorney General for Canada de 1930 retomada por la Corte Suprema de Canadá en la sentencia de 9 de diciembre de 2004 sobre el matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo-que, a través de una interpretación evolutiva, se acomoda a las realidades de la vida moderna como medio para asegurar su propia relevancia y legitimidad, y no sólo porque se trate de un texto cuyos grandes principios son de aplicación a supuestos que sus redactores no imaginaron, sino también porque los poderes públicos, y particularmente el legislador, van actualizando esos principios paulatinamente y porque el Tribunal Constitucional, cuando controla el ajuste constitucional de esas actualizaciones, dota a las normas de un contenido que permita leer el texto constitucional a la luz de los problemas contemporáneos, y de las exigencias de la sociedad actual a que debe dar respuesta la norma fundamental del ordenamiento jurídico a riesgo, en caso contrario, de convertirse en letra muerta. Esa lectura evolutiva de la Constitución, que se proyecta en especial a la categoría de la garantía institucional, nos lleva a desarrollar la noción de cultura jurídica, que hace pensar en el Derecho como un fenómeno social vinculado a la realidad en que se desarrolla y que ya ha sido evocada en nuestra jurisprudencia previa (SSTC 17/1985, de 9 de febrero, FJ 4; 89/1993, de 12 de marzo, FJ 3; 341/1993, de 18 de noviembre, FJ 3; 29/1995, de 6 de febrero, FJ 3; y 298/2000, de 11 de diciembre, FJ 11) . Pues bien, la cultura jurídica no se construye sólo desde la interpretación literal, sistemática u originalista de los textos jurídicos, sino que también contribuyen a su configuración la observación de la realidad social jurídicamente relevante, sin que esto signifique otorgar fuerza normativa directa a lo fáctico, las opiniones de la doctrina jurídica y de los órganos consultivos previstos en el propio ordenamiento, el Derecho comparado que se da en un entorno socio-cultural próximo y, en materia de la construcción de la cultura jurídica de los derechos, la actividad internacional de los Estados manifestada en los tratados internacionales, en la jurisprudencia de los órganos internacionales que los interpretan, y en las opiniones y dictámenes elaboradas por los órganos competentes del sistema de Naciones Unidas, así como por otros organismos internacionales de reconocida posición.'
